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100 N.C. L. REV. 919 (2022)

Mental Health History Is History: A Lifetime Ban on Gun Possession
Due to History of Involuntary Commitment Violates the Second
Amendment*
Gun control is a widely debated issue in the United States that often centers on
whether restricting access to firearms will increase safety. What is often left
undiscussed is the stigma and stereotypes that long-lasting bans on firearm possession
have on those subjected to gun control laws. Section 922(g)(4) of the Gun Control Act
imposes a lifetime ban on gun possession for persons who have a history of involuntary
commitment. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, in Tyler v. Hillsdale County and Mai
v. United States, respectively, were asked to decide whether this lifetime ban violates
the Second Amendment. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Sixth Circuit said yes
while the Ninth Circuit said no.
This Recent Development examines this resulting circuit split as well as the
government’s justifications for § 922(g)(4)—preventing crime and suicide—and
argues § 922(g)(4) fails to adequately address those important issues, making it
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Section 922(g)(4) permanently
categorizes those with a history of involuntary commitment as mentally ill, instead of
addressing the real issue: keeping guns out of the hands of those who currently present
a danger to themselves and others. Recognizing that the government’s interests are
nevertheless important, this Recent Development proposes the adoption of a federal
extreme risk law that adequately instills measures aimed to prevent crime and suicide
while also protecting the rights of those subjected to involuntary commitment.
INTRODUCTION
A little over fifty years have passed since Congress enacted the Gun
Control Act of 1968.1 The Act, which prevents nine categories of people from
possessing firearms,2 has stirred political debates3 and prompted a line of
decisions by the Supreme Court.4 Yet, its effects on those targeted groups are
* © 2022 Laura E. Johnson.
1. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 26 U.S.C.).
2. Id. at 1220–21 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)–(9)).
3. See Katherine Schaeffer, Key Facts About Americans and Guns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 13,
2021), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/13/key-facts-about-americans-and-guns/ [http:
//perma.cc/CPD2-BCWF] (showing a divide in Americans’ views on gun control laws).
4. See generally Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (holding that a person must
know that they were within the nine categories of individuals specified by the statute who cannot
lawfully possess firearms when they possessed the firearm); Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272
(2016) (applying the federal ban on firearms possession to a defendant with a prior misdemeanor
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still being revealed today. Specifically, one category of persons subject to the
Act—those “adjudicated as a mental defective” or “committed to a mental
institution”5—live with the stigma that they are permanently dangerous.6
Whether those with a history of involuntary commitment should be able to
possess a firearm not only presents a public policy issue but a constitutional
one as well. In Tyler v. Hillsdale County7 and Mai v. United States,8 the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits, respectively, considered for the first time whether the
lifetime ban on gun possession imposed on those with a history of involuntary
commitment9 by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) is constitutional.10
This Recent Development examines the government’s justifications for
§ 922(g)(4)—preventing crime and suicide—and argues that a lifetime ban on
gun possession for those with a history of involuntary commitment fails to
adequately address those important issues, making it unconstitutional under
the Second Amendment. Further, this Recent Development argues that
§ 922(g)(4) permanently categorizes those with a history of involuntary
commitment as mentally ill instead of addressing the real issue: keeping guns
out of the hands of those who currently present a danger to themselves and
others. The stories of Charles Tyler and Duy Mai show the ways in which
current law and its past enforcement mechanisms have failed to strike an
appropriate balance between advocating for gun safety and addressing the
nation’s mental health crisis without promoting stigma and stereotyping.
Further, the Ninth Circuit’s support of the government in its Mai opinion
affirms the government’s failure to take appropriate steps towards preventing
the issue of suicide—the very issue the government claims justifies a lifetime
ban.

conviction for use of physical force against a domestic relation); Henderson v. United States, 575
U.S. 622 (2015) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) does not apply to a felon who does not retain
control over his guns); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (finding that the “convicted in
any court” element of a federal felon-in-possession-of-firearm statute does not include convictions
obtained in foreign courts).
5. Gun Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 1221 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)).
6. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Violence and Mental Disorders: Data and Public Policy, 163 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1319, 1320 (2006).
7. 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
8. 952 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2020).
9. Involuntary commitment is “a legal intervention by which a judge, or someone acting in a
judicial capacity, may order that a person with symptoms of a serious mental disorder, and meeting
other specified criteria, be confined in a psychiatric hospital or receive supervised outpatient
treatment for some period of time.” SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE MENTAL HEALTH CARE CONTINUUM: HISTORICAL TRENDS
AND PRINCIPLES FOR LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2019) [hereinafter SAMHSA], https://www.samhsa.
gov/sites/default/files/civil-commitment-continuum-of-care.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA45-6K3P].
10. In Beers v. Attorney General United States, 927 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2019), the Third Circuit also
considered this question. Id. at 159 (holding § 922(g)(4) constitutional).
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This analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
§ 922(g)(4) and the current circuit split regarding the effectual lifetime ban
this law creates. Part II assesses the legality of such a ban under a Second
Amendment two-step inquiry and argues both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
failed to appropriately apply strict scrutiny, rather than intermediate scrutiny,
in their respective holdings. Part III examines the justifications of
§ 922(g)(4)’s lifetime ban—advanced by both Congress and the government
in Mai—which the Ninth Circuit adamantly supported. Part III further argues
that the government’s failure to adequately address mental health causes these
arguments to fall short under both intermediate and strict scrutiny. Lastly,
Part IV examines possible solutions that would adequately instill measures
aimed to prevent crime and suicide while also protecting the rights of those
subjected to involuntary commitment, such as the enactment of a new federal
extreme risk law.
I. BACKGROUND
This part provides background on § 922(g)(4) and explains why the
relief programs that once made this statute less burdensome are no longer
available. This part also provides background on the current circuit split
regarding whether or not § 922(g)(4)’s lifetime ban is constitutional.
A.

A History of § 922(g)(4) and Its Counterparts

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), it is unlawful for any person who has been
“adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental
institution” to possess a firearm.11 This includes “a formal commitment of a
person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority,”12 which is colloquially known as an involuntary commitment.13
Since state law governs this adjudication process, involuntary commitment
laws vary by state.14 However, almost all states have laws governing three
forms of court-ordered involuntary commitment: emergency hospitalization
for evaluation, inpatient civil commitment, and outpatient civil commitment.15
While the verbiage and standards differ by state, some commonalities exist.16
For inpatient civil commitment, all states require a showing of “mental

11. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
12. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2021).
13. SAMHSA, supra note 9, at 1.
14. Id.
15. Know the Laws in Your State, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., https://www.treatmentadvocacy
center.org/component/content/article/183-in-a-crisis/1596-know-the-laws-in-your-state [http://perma
.cc/KQG5-EFER]. Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Tennessee are the only states that do
not currently have laws providing for court-ordered outpatient treatment. Id.
16. SAMHSA, supra note 9, at 11–12.
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illness,” though the definition of “mental illness” varies by state.17 Further,
almost all state laws also require a showing of “dangerousness”; however, the
definition, recency of such danger, and relation to propensity of violence
drastically vary by state.18
Other sections of the Gun Control Act reveal that Congress did not
intend for § 922(g)(4) to be an absolute bar to gun possession for persons
involuntarily committed. The Gun Control Act included a provision, now
codified at § 925(c), to allow individuals to apply to the Attorney General for
relief from the disabilities imposed by § 922(g).19 Applicable regulations grant
the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(“ATF”) the power to grant relief from § 922(g)20 if the Director finds “the
applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and
that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to public interest.”21
Though this appears to give the director much subjective discretion, the
director may not grant relief unless the person has “subsequently [been]
determined by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority to have
been restored to mental competency, to be no longer suffering from a mental
disorder, and to have had all rights restored.”22 Any denial by the ATF can be
appealed to the appropriate federal district court.23 Currently, however, no
individual has the ability to seek relief through this provision, as Congress
indefinitely defunded the relief-from-disabilities program in 1992.24 This, in
turn, prohibits an individual from having their claim reviewed by a federal
court.25
Even still, Congress managed to provide a new remedy. To better
enforce § 922(g)(4), Congress implemented the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007 (“NIAA”),26 which sought to strengthen the

17. See id. at 11.
18. See id. at 8–9.
19. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1225 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 925(c)).
20. 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1) (2021); 27 C.F.R. § 478.144(d) (2021).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c); 27 C.F.R. § 478.144(d).
22. 27 C.F.R. § 478.144(e).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
24. Tyler v. Hillsdale County, 837 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2016); see Treasury Department
Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (“That none of the funds
appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or at upon applications for relief from Federal
firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. [§] 925(c).”); see also United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 75 n.3
(2002) (listing Congress’s appropriation restrictions).
25. See Bean, 537 U.S. at 78 (“The absence of an actual denial of respondent’s petition by ATF
precludes judicial review under § 925(c).”).
26. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note).
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National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”).27 The NIAA
functions as an incentive mechanism: when states report mental health
histories to the NICS, the government must extend grant funding to states to
enhance their criminal history reporting systems.28 In exchange for a grant,
states are required to (1) report involuntary commitment records to the
national system and (2) implement a state program that provides relief from
§ 922(g)(4), similar to the program previously run by the ATF.29 Currently,
only thirty-two states have created qualifying relief programs,30 meaning those
residing in a state without a program still have no access to relief from
§ 922(g)(4). This has led those with a history of involuntary commitment to
seek an alternative route to relief: challenging the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(4).
B.

The Sixth Circuit’s Take: Tyler v. Hillsdale County

In 1985, Charles Tyler’s wife of twenty-three years left him for another
man and depleted Tyler’s finances, leaving him “emotionally devastated.”31
Concerned for his safety, Tyler’s daughters contacted the police and arranged
for a psychological evaluation for their father.32 As a result of the evaluation,
Tyler was involuntarily committed for less than one month after a Michigan
probate court found that Tyler was “reasonably expected” to cause serious
physical injuries to himself or others in the near future.33 Since his discharge,
Tyler has not needed follow-up therapy, has held a steady job for eighteen
years, and has remarried.34 In 2012, Tyler received substance-abuse and
psychological evaluations which reported no signs of mental illness, and the
doctor specifically concluded that Tyler’s incident in 1985 was a “brief reactive
depressive episode.”35
27. See generally Implementation of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 81 Fed.
Reg. 91,702 (Dec. 19, 2016) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 421) (discussing the Social Security
Administration’s implementation of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007).
28. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 301.
29. Id. Under these programs,
a State court, board, commission, or other lawful authority shall grant the relief . . . if the
circumstances regarding the disabilities . . . and the person’s record and reputation, are such
that the person will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
Id. § 105(a)(2).
30. See BECKI GOGGINS & ANNE GALLEGOS, STATE PROGRESS IN RECORD REPORTING
FOR FIREARM-RELATED BACKGROUND CHECKS: MENTAL HEALTH SUBMISSIONS 8 (2016),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249793.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQG5-EFER].
31. Tyler v. Hillsdale County, 837 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2016).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 683–84.
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Tyler’s home state of Michigan did not have an ATF-approved relieffrom-disabilities program. Therefore, Tyler’s only recourse to obtain a firearm
was to bring federal suit, alleging that, due to Michigan’s lack of a relief-fromdisabilities program, § 922(g)(4) violated his Second Amendment right
because of the permanent ban it placed on him.36 The Sixth Circuit applied
the usual two-step approach used to resolve Second Amendment challenges,37
asking: (1) “whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the
scope of the Second Amendment right, as historically understood,” and if so,
(2) whether the government’s justification of the restriction is strong enough
to survive the appropriate level of scrutiny.38 Under step one, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the government did not meet its burden of proof
showing that people with a history of involuntary commitment are historically
understood as unprotected by the Second Amendment.39 Proceeding under
step two, and finding that intermediate scrutiny should be applied,40 the court
asked whether there was an important governmental interest for § 922(g)(4)’s
ban and whether § 922(g)(4) was reasonably related to that interest.41 The
Sixth Circuit found the government’s interests of (1) protecting the
community from crime and (2) preventing suicide to be “not only legitimate,
[but] compelling.”42 Keeping in mind that the ban imposed on Tyler and those
similarly situated is effectively permanent,43 the court required that the
government show evidence of the continuing need to disarm those who were
involuntarily committed years ago.44 Ultimately, the court found that the
government’s submitted evidence, which showed higher rates of suicide from
those involuntarily committed, did not answer “the key question at the heart
of this case: Is it reasonably necessary to forever bar all previously

36. Id. at 684 (bringing an as-applied challenge).
37. See id. at 685 (first citing United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); then
citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); then citing United States v.
Chester (Chester I), 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); and then citing United States v. Reese, 627
F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010)).
38. Id. at 685–86.
39. Id. at 689–90 (“In the face of what is at best ambiguous historical support, it would be
peculiar to conclude that § 922(g)(4) does not burden conduct within the ambit of the Second
Amendment as historically understood based on nothing more than Heller’s observation that such a
regulation is ‘presumptively lawful.’”).
40. Id. at 691–92. “To hold, as Tyler requests, that he is at the core of the Second Amendment
despite his history of mental illness would cut too hard against Congress’s power to categorically
prohibit certain presumptively dangerous people from gun ownership.” Id. (reasoning that strict
scrutiny was not applicable under these facts).
41. Id. at 693.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 694.
44. Id. (reasoning that a higher burden is required because the ban imposed by § 922(g)(4) is
“effectively permanent”).
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institutionalized persons from owning a firearm?”45 Most influential in the
court’s reasoning was the very fact that from 1986 to 1992, Congress itself
effectively answered “no” to this question through the enactment of § 925(c),
as well as the NICS Improvement Amendments Act.46 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional as applied to Charles Tyler.47
C.

The Ninth Circuit’s Take: Mai v. United States

Four years after the Tyler decision, the Ninth Circuit came to the
opposite conclusion in Mai v. United States.48 In 1999, at age seventeen, Duy
Mai was involuntarily committed for nine months after a Washington state
court determined he was both mentally ill and dangerous.49 Since then, Mai
has earned his GED, a bachelor’s and master’s degree, has held a steady job,
and started a family.50 Mai had also already successfully petitioned a
Washington state court for relief from the Washington state law that
prohibited him from possessing a firearm;51 however, the standard for relief
required by Washington law is lower than that required by federal law.52
To gain legal access to a firearm under Washington law, Mai only
needed to show he “no longer presents a substantial danger to himself [] or the
public.”53 However, for Washington’s process to qualify as an ATF-approved
relief-from-disabilities program, the relevant relief law must require a
determination that “the person will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety” and that granting “relief would not be contrary to the public
interest.”54 Thus, Mai also had no choice but to argue that his Second
Amendment right was violated by the lifetime ban.55 Like the Sixth Circuit in
Tyler, the Ninth Circuit also found under a two-step analysis that § 922(g)(4)
burdened Mai’s Second Amendment right and that intermediate scrutiny
should be applied.56 The court also agreed that the government has two
45. Id. at 697.
46. Id. (“It is a clear indication that Congress does not believe that previously committed
persons are sufficiently dangerous as a class to permanently deprive all such persons of their Second
Amendment right to bear arms.”).
47. Id. at 699.
48. See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020).
49. Id. at 1110.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.040(2)(a)(iv) (Westlaw through ch. 1 of the
2022 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.).
52. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 1112.
53. § 9.41.047(3)(c)(iii).
54. 34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(2).
55. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117 (“[Mai] argues that the continued application of the prohibition to him
is no longer justified because of the passage of time and his alleged mental health and peaceableness in
recent years.”).
56. Id. at 1115 (“Just as intermediate scrutiny applies to the other lifetime bans in § 922(g), so
too does intermediate scrutiny apply to § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition.”).
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important interests: (1) preventing crime and (2) preventing suicide.57
However, the Ninth Circuit held that § 922(g)(4)’s lifetime ban on gun
possession survived intermediate scrutiny and did not violate Mai’s Second
Amendment right. The court relied upon Congress’s judgment, which was
supported by scientific evidence, that those who have been involuntarily
committed pose an increased risk of violence long after being involuntarily
committed.58
II. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IS THE WRONG TEST
This part provides further insight into the two-step inquiry traditionally
used when courts face Second Amendment challenges and how the Supreme
Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller59 left courts with little
guidance as to which level of scrutiny should be applied. Because § 922(g)(4)
is a permanent denial of a fundamental right, this part argues that both the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits erred in applying intermediate scrutiny rather than
strict scrutiny.
A.

The Second Amendment and the Two-Step Inquiry

The Second Amendment guarantees “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”60 In Heller, the Supreme Court made a
monumental decision: the Second Amendment secures “an individual right to
keep and bear arms” without regard to a militia service.61 However, the Court
noted that the right is “not unlimited”62 and that, among other categories,
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill”63 are “presumptively lawful.”64
When assessing Second Amendment challenges, courts use a two-step
inquiry asking: “(1) whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by
the Second Amendment and (2) if so, directs courts to apply an appropriate
level of scrutiny.”65 A law fails step one of the inquiry “if it either falls within
57. Id. at 1116.
58. Id. at 1117–19.
59. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
61. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 626–27.
64. Id. at 627 n.26; see also Lindsay Colvin, History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What
Is the Proper Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1052
(2014).
65. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Tyler v. Hillsdale
County, 837 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2016) (first citing United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518
(6th Cir. 2012); then citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); then citing
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one of the ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ identified in Heller or
regulates conduct that historically has fallen outside the scope of the Second
Amendment.”66 Heller provided a list of “presumptively lawful” prohibitions,
giving courts an easy escape route to determine that laws like § 922(g)(4) do
not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment.67 This was the case
for the Ninth Circuit in Mai, as they found that the plaintiff’s claims were
rooted in the type of presumptively lawful regulation explicitly allowed by
Heller.68 By doing so, the Ninth Circuit made its first failure by necessarily
equating “mentally ill,” a presumptively lawful group to prohibit from
possessing guns as noted in Heller,69 with anyone who has ever been
involuntarily committed to a mental institution. As the Sixth Circuit properly
recognized, Heller spoke of “the mentally ill.”70 However, this phrase is
entirely absent in § 922(g)(4), which uses judicial adjudications as a proxy for
mental illness.71 Despite its overbroad generalization, the Ninth Circuit
continued to step two of the analysis by “assum[ing], without deciding, that
§ 922(g)(4), as applied to [Mai], burdens Second Amendment rights.”72
What Heller lacks is an answer to the question of what level of scrutiny
should be applied.73 Though it is agreed that more than rational basis review is
required,74 the level of scrutiny applied in Second Amendment challenges
depends “on (1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”75 In
Tyler, the Sixth Circuit denied Tyler’s request to apply strict scrutiny,
reasoning that “[t]o hold, as Tyler requests, that he is at the core of the
Second Amendment despite his history of mental illness would cut too hard
against Congress’s power to categorically prohibit certain presumptively

Chester I, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); and then citing United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792,
800–01 (10th Cir. 2010)).
66. Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.
Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013)).
67. Chester I, 628 F.3d at 679 (“Some courts have treated Heller’s listing of ‘presumptively
lawful regulatory measures,’ for all practical purposes, as a kind of ‘safe harbor . . . [but] . . . [t]his
approach . . . approximates rational-basis review, which has been rejected by Heller.”); see also United
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1050 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“Rather than
seriously wrestling with how to apply this new Second Amendment rule . . . courts will continue to
simply reference the applicable Heller dictum and move on.”).
68. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1114.
69. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
70. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 687.
71. Id.
72. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115.
73. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
74. Id.
75. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013).
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dangerous people from gun ownership.”76 In making this statement, the Sixth
Circuit undercut its well-reasoned analysis that involuntary commitment is
not the equivalent of the “mentally ill” category set out in Heller.77 The Tyler
court backed away from applying strict scrutiny to § 922(g)(4), concerned that
it would “invert Heller’s presumption that prohibitions on the mentally ill are
lawful.”78 Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits agreed that “§ 922(g)(4) does not
burden the public at large,” but instead “burdens only a narrow class of
individuals who are not at the core of the Second Amendment—those . . .
previously involuntarily committed,”79 and therefore justified placing strict
scrutiny aside.80 Ultimately, stereotyping those once involuntarily committed
as dangerous, mentally ill persons resulted in the application of the wrong
form of scrutiny.
B.

Why Strict Scrutiny Should Have Been Applied

Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits should have applied strict scrutiny in
Tyler and Mai because a lifetime ban on gun possession due to a history of
involuntary commitment, not a diagnosed and current mental illness, severely
infringes upon the core right of the Second Amendment. The Court in Heller,
having already ruled out rational basis review,81 warned that when choosing
whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny, a court must consider the
severity of the regulation: “A less severe regulation—a regulation that does
not encroach on the core of the Second Amendment—requires a less
demanding means-end showing.”82
However, when “fundamental rights” are at stake, strict scrutiny should
be applied.83 The Supreme Court has ruled that the Second Amendment is
indeed one of those fundamental rights.84 As told by Heller, the core right of
the Second Amendment is “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to
use arms in defense of hearth and home.”85 Though Heller further affirmed
that the mentally ill do not strike at the core of the Second Amendment,86
Heller in no way indicated that this characterization includes persons who
76. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 691 (“[T]he Heller Court understood that Congress’s power to enact
categorical disqualifications was ‘part of the original meaning’ of the Second Amendment.” (citing
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010))).
77. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
78. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 691.
79. Id.; Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2020).
80. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 692.
81. Heller v. United States, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27, 634–35 (2008).
82. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012).
83. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
84. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 746 (2010) (“The Court is correct in describing
the Second Amendment right as ‘fundamental’ to the American scheme of ordered liberty.”).
85. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
86. Id. at 626–27.
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formerly struggled with mental illness. A person with a past record of
involuntary commitment cannot be deemed lawless or irresponsible without
further individual assessment. In fact, the majority of involuntarily committed
patients are not violent a year after discharge.87 To maintain that those with a
record of involuntary commitment have less entitlement to a fundamental
right than others is to stereotype a group of people based on their past and
affirmatively state that mental illness is static.88 Thus, applying strict scrutiny
to § 922(g)(4) is appropriate and requires that the statute be “narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”89
III. WHY § 922(G)(4) FAILS UNDER BOTH INTERMEDIATE AND STRICT
SCRUTINY
While it is without question that the government has both an important
and compelling interest in reducing crime and suicide, as this part lays out,
§ 922(g)(4) is not narrowly tailored to such interests, let alone substantially
related. Strict scrutiny aside, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that
§ 922(g)(4) passed intermediate scrutiny. While Congress should be able to
pass laws that keep guns out of the hands of the mentally ill, that limit should
be narrowly imposed upon those persons who are currently dangerous in order
to survive constitutional muster.90
A.

Congress’s Important and Compelling Interests for § 922(g)(4)

Because both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits found that intermediate
scrutiny applied,91 the government had to identify an important interest
promoted by § 922(g)(4).92 Congress’s purpose in enacting the Gun Control
Act was to prevent crime by keeping “firearms out of the hands of those not
legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or

87. See Henry J. Steadman, Edward P. Mulvey, John Monaham, Pamela Clark Robbins, Paul S.
Appelbaum, Thomas Grisso, Loren H. Roth & Eric Silver, Violence by People Discharged from Acute
Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 393, 399–400 (1998).
88. See Tyler v. Hillsdale County, 837 F.3d 678, 720 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring)
(“If the individual has ever [been involuntarily committed] says the government, that is that: He
necessarily is a risk to himself or others for the rest of his life and thus may not possess a gun for the
rest of his life. That is a remarkable proposition.”).
89. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997).
90. “History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power
to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns. But that power extends only to people who are
dangerous.” Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
91. Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2020); Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693.
92. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Although courts have used
various terminology to describe the intermediate scrutiny standard, all forms of the standard [first]
require [] the government’s stated objective to be significant, substantial, or important.”).
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incompetency.”93 More specifically, Congress had two purposes for enacting
§ 922(g)(4): (1) protecting the community from crime and (2) preventing
suicide, both of which were intended to be accomplished by “cut[ting] down
or eliminat[ing] firearms deaths caused by persons who are not criminals, but
who commit sudden, unpremeditated crimes with firearms as a result of
mental disturbances.”94
Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, once the government has
articulated an important interest, “[a]ll that is required is ‘a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.’”95
Because § 922(g)(4) imposes a lifetime ban on gun possession—since it
applies to any person that was at any point involuntarily committed—the
government should be required to present evidence of a continuing need to
disarm those who were involuntarily committed many years ago to justify the
law.96
B.

Justifications Used in Mai

In applying intermediate scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit accepted the
government’s argument that § 922(g)(4) is reasonably related to preventing
suicide.97 However, the court entirely failed to articulate a reason as to why
§ 922(g)(4) promotes the government’s interest of reducing crime. The court
only generalized that: “like felons and domestic-violence assailants, those who
have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution also pose an
increased risk of violence,” and that “scientific evidence amply supports” such
a conclusion.98 Thus, the court concluded § “922(g)(4)’s prohibition is . . . a
reasonable fit for the government’s laudable goal of preventing gun
violence.”99 However, this referenced scientific evidence—which assesses the
likelihood that those with a mental illness will commit suicide—was only used
to justify the law in terms of preventing suicide, not crime.100 The court
pointed to a meta-analysis, cited to by the government, which studied the
relationship between suicide and a record of mental illness.101 The study found
that up to eight and a half years after release from involuntary commitment,
93. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968).
94. See 114 CONG. REC. 21,829 (1968).
95. Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus Metro. Libr., 346 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
96. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694.
97. Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for Mental Disorders: A MetaAnalysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 205 (1997).
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such persons had a suicide risk thirty-nine times what was expected based on
World Health Organization mortality statistics.102 Patients studied up to
fifteen years after discharge from in-patient treatment were found to have a
suicide risk seven times that of a person who had not been involuntarily
committed.103 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “although the
scientific evidence suggests that Plaintiff’s increased risk of suicide decreases
over time, nothing suggests that it ever dissipates entirely.”104
Mai specifically asserted that § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied
to him, someone who no longer suffers from mental illness.105 The court noted
that if they were to assess Mai personally, “nothing in the record suggests that
[Mai’s] level of risk is nonexistent or that his level of risk matches the risk
associated with a similarly situated person who lacks a history of mental
illness.”106 The court made this conclusory statement after noting that Mai’s
psychological evaluation indicated that he had less of a risk of suicide than the
base rate for individuals with a psychiatric history.107 More specifically, Mai’s
psychological evaluation indicated that he has a “low risk for future violence”
and does not have a “significant suicide risk.”108
C.

Why These Justifications Are Not Reasonable and Fail Intermediate Scrutiny

The statistics cited by the government109—that those with a history of
involuntarily commitment have an increased risk of suicide—do not justify a
lifetime ban on gun possession, as its scope is entirely out of proportion to the
interests served. These statistics lump together all persons with a history of
involuntary commitment and do little to show Mai and Tyler’s—and other
similarly situated persons’—mental health status today.110 Under intermediate
scrutiny, the government needed to have “presented sufficient evidence of the
continued risk presented by persons who were previously committed.”111 This
section argues that a lifetime ban on gun possession for those with a history of
involuntary commitment is unconstitutional because the arguments used to
justify the ban—that it is substantially related to preventing crime and
suicide—are undercut by the reality of what it means to be involuntarily
committed and the ever-climbing rates of suicide.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 205, 219–20.
Id. at 221.
Mai, 952 F.3d at 1118.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
Tyler v. Hillsdale County, 837 F.3d 678, 696 (6th Cir. 2016).
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1. Section 922(g)(4) Is Categorically Underinclusive
First, a categorical ban on those involuntarily committed is so
underinclusive, both in terms of effectively targeting those who pose a danger
in possessing guns and preventing suicide, that the fit between § 922(g)(4)’s
goals and its effects is unreasonable.112 For example, not everyone who has
spent time receiving treatment for a mental health issue, no matter how
serious the mental illness may be, has their Second Amendment right
infringed upon. Federal regulation 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 sheds light on the
meaning of “adjudicated as a mental defective” and maintains that § 922(g)(4)
only applies to persons involuntary committed, not those voluntarily
committed.113 Thus, § 922(g)(4) is too narrow in scope: it is unreasonable for
the government to maintain that persons who were previously involuntarily
committed still maintain a risk strong enough to justify denying their Second
Amendment right when those who were voluntarily committed never had
their right suppressed, even when presenting an immediate danger to
themselves and others.
If the purpose of § 922(g)(4) is to keep guns out of the hands of the
mentally ill, there is no reason to differentiate between involuntarily and
voluntarily committed patients. To be voluntarily committed, a physician
must determine that the individual has a mental disorder and would benefit
from treatment.114 No person will be admitted unless a medical professional
confirms the individual’s need for “observation, diagnosis, evaluation, care or
treatment.”115 The main difference between involuntary commitment and
voluntary commitment is that the former is court ordered, while the latter
requires that the individual have capacity to give informed consent for
commitment.116 This does not necessarily mean persons voluntarily committed
112. In the equal protection context, the Supreme Court has generally only permitted statutory
classifications to be underinclusive and overinclusive when applying rational basis review. See, e.g.,
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108–09 (1979) (“We accept such imperfection because it is in turn
rationally related to the secondary objective of legislative convenience.”); see also Robert C. Farrell,
Equal Protection: Overinclusive Classifications and Individual Rights, 41 ARK. L. REV. 1, 17–21 (1988)
(explaining that “even grossly overinclusive classifications are permissible” when rational basis is
applied in an equal protection context and listing examples of relevant cases); id. at 23 (explaining
that “a substantial number of overinclusive sex classifications have been invalidated” when
intermediate scrutiny is applied in an equal protection context); id. at 29 (explaining that an
“extremely tight fit between classification and purpose” is required to satisfy strict scrutiny in equal
protection cases).
113. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2021) (“A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency,
condition, or disease: is a danger to himself or to others; or lacks the mental capacity to contract or
manage his own affairs.”).
114. Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitalization: Myth or
Reality?, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 27 (1999).
115. Id. at 30.
116. See id. at 35–37.
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have higher capacity than those involuntarily committed. In fact, one study
found that those voluntarily committed were more impaired in capacity than
those involuntarily committed.117 In sum, there is no difference between the
“mental illness” status of those voluntarily committed and those involuntarily
committed. Thus, the argument that § 922(g)(4) effectively keeps guns out of
the hands of the mentally ill is severely undercut because the statute does not
even apply to all persons previously committed to an institution for mental
illness.
Rather, the framing of § 922(g)(4) effectively creates a suppression of
rights for those who may have limited resources and ability to seek voluntary
treatment at no fault of their own,118 despite the shared struggle of mental
illness for both groups. It is difficult to say how many people § 922(g)(4)
disproportionately affects.119 Tracking the number of people who are
involuntarily committed in the United States each year is complicated for a
myriad of reasons.120 Patient privacy concerns, the criteria for commitment
varying by jurisdiction, and decentralized mental health care systems prevent
easy access to publicly available information.121 A 2015 study showed that an
estimated nine out of every one thousand people with a serious mental illness
were involuntarily committed.122 But in comparison, it is expected that one in
twenty adults experience serious mental illness each year.123 The 2019 National
Survey on Drug Use and Health showed that from 2002 to 2019, the
percentage of people who received inpatient mental health services increased
from 0.7% (1.5 million) to 1% (2.4 million).124 A 2008 study found that fifty
beds per one hundred thousand people would be sufficient to meet the needs
for acute and long-term inpatient care, but in many states, there are as little as
five beds per every one hundred thousand people available.125 These statistics
indicate that even if one sought voluntary inpatient treatment, it may be
impossible to obtain and could instead result in involuntary commitment.126

117. Id. at 46.
118. See infra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
119. See Nathaniel P. Morris, Detention Without Data: Public Tracking of Civil Commitment, 71
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 741, 741–42 (2020).
120. See id.
121. Id. at 742.
122. SAMHSA, supra note 9, at 8. A serious or severe mental illness can be defined as: “A
longstanding mental illness that causes moderate-to-severe disability of prolonged duration.” Daniel
Yohanna, History of Medicine: Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental Illness: Causes and
Consequences, 15 VIRTUAL MENTOR, 886, 886 (2013).
123. Mental Health by the Numbers, NAT’L. ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.
org/mhstats [https://perma.cc/6NNM-LDHZ] (Mar. 2021) [hereinafter NAMI].
124. SAMHSA, supra note 9, at 5.
125. Yohanna, supra note 122, at 886.
126. Id. It is worth noting this deficiency can lead to people with severe mental illnesses being
homeless or finding their housing in the criminal justice system. Id.
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Nevertheless, if § 922(g)(4) only targets those who have been adjudicated to a
mental institution, the law necessarily neglects to keep guns out of the hands
of those who seek voluntary treatment, such as the millions of Americans who
suffer from mental illness.
The law is also underinclusive in terms of properly addressing the
important interest of preventing suicide. As both the Mai and Tyler courts
noted, suicide by firearm is a huge crisis in America.127 The 2021 Brady Report
shows that sixty-three people die by suicide with a gun every day.128 But
Congress has remained unchallenged as to whether § 922(g)(4) actually
reduces suicide by a meaningful number to justify a lifetime ban. In fact,
firearm suicides have increased almost every year since 2006.129 There is no
indication that suicide rates are declining—“[a]mong adults aged eighteen or
older, the percentage who had serious thoughts of suicide in the past year
increased from 3.7% in 2008 to 4.8% in 2019” with the estimates increasing
each year through that time period.130 The government in Tyler relied in part
on the Brady Center’s studies showing that “those with a past suicide attempt
are more likely than the general public to commit suicide at a later date and
that firearms are the most likely method for committing suicide.”131 As the
Sixth Circuit noted, this would justify keeping those with a history of suicide
attempts from possessing guns, but “does not fully justify the need to
permanently disarm anyone who has been involuntarily committed for
whatever reason.”132 The ever-present and ever-increasing problem of suicide
forces us to ask if § 922(g)(4) has even made a reasonable impact on reducing
suicide. In sum, because § 922(g)(4) is underinclusive in terms of effectively
targeting both persons with mental illnesses who may pose a danger in
possessing guns and those at risk of committing suicide, the fit between
§ 922(g)(4)’s goals and its effects is unreasonable.
2. Section 922(g)(4) Is Categorically Overinclusive
While a statute can regulate more people than necessary and still be
constitutional, that “amount of overreach must be reasonable.”133 The legal
127. See BRADY UNITED AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, THE TRUTH ABOUT SUICIDE AND GUNS
5 [hereinafter BRADY REPORT], https://brady-static.s3.amazonaws.com/Gun-Suicide-Prevention.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48AY-S57Q].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2019 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 48 (2020), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/
files/reports/rpt29393/2019NSDUHFFRPDFWHTML/2019NSDUHFFR1PDFW090120.pdf [http
://perma.cc/2B5Q-93CP].
131. Tyler v. Hillsdale County, 837 F.3d 678, 695 (6th Cir. 2016).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 698.
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standard for firearm bans is not limited to the mentally ill: “State firearm bans
are not limited to the acutely, or even potentially, psychotic. Again, the key
trigger for a firearm ban in most places is commitment to an inpatient
facility.”134 Thus, the application of § 922(g)(4) is not limited to those with
severe mental illness who are likely to misuse firearms. Rather, the statute
encompasses anyone who has ever been involuntarily committed, making it
wholly unrelated to “cut[ting] down or eliminat[ing] firearms deaths caused
by persons who are not criminals, but who commit sudden, unpremeditated
crimes with firearms as a result of mental disturbances.”135 This category of
previously committed persons not only includes those who have since
recovered from their decade-old illness that led to their commitment, but it
also includes many other groups of people who never even suffered from
mental illnesses that resulted in “unpremeditated crimes with firearms.” In
general, people may be involuntarily committed if they are found to be both
dangerous and have a mental illness.136 Because being involuntarily committed
does not hinge on a person’s risk of harming themselves or others by use of
firearms, the population of people subjected to § 922(g)(4) is broader than
necessary to keep guns out of the hands of persons likely to commit crimes
with firearms.
For example, persons with eating disorders are frequently subjected to
involuntary commitment.137 Death rates for this group of people are
unfortunately high and involuntary commitment can be justified in an attempt
to save their lives.138 Though persons with eating disorders may contemplate
suicide, death most often occurs because of medical complications of chronic
starvation and purging behaviors.139 Thus, although an eating disorder
constitutes a mental illness and this mental illness presents a danger of selfharm, persons with this mental illness are not likely to misuse firearms,140 yet
are still subject to a lifetime ban of gun possession due to their history of
involuntary commitment.

134. Fedrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right To Bear Arms?,
48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 15 (2013).
135. See 114 CONG. REC. 21,829 (1968).
136. SAMHSA, supra note 9, at 11–12.
137. Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 PSYCHIATRY 30, 37
(2010).
138. See id.
139. Id.; see also Manfred Maximilian Fichter & Nobert Quadflieg, Mortality in Eating Disorders –
Results of a Large Prospective Clinical Longitudinal Study, 49 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 391, 395
(2016).
140. Michael Ollove, States Tackle Mental Illness and Gun Ownership, PEW (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/03/21/states-tackle-mentalillness-and-gun-ownership [https://perma.cc/3ZFQ-GLCT].
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Another group with high involuntary commitment rates is people with
substance abuse disorders.141 The term “committed to a mental institution” in
§ 922(g)(4) includes a commitment for drug use.142 Substance abusers often
end up involuntarily committed, not because they are considered dangerous,
but rather because of high rates of treatment reluctance and refusal of
treatment that is required for survival.143 Some involuntary commitment state
laws do not even require a finding of dangerousness in order to involuntarily
commit these persons, and instead solely rely on a finding of drug
dependence.144 The opioid crisis has led to many states passing laws that allow
for involuntary commitment on the basis of substance use.145 In 1991, only
eighteen states permitted involuntary commitment for substance abuse alone;
that number is now at least thirty-eight.146 Not only do state involuntary
commitment laws like these fail to effectively treat substance users, they target
persons who are not even likely to commit violent crimes.147
Finally, minority populations have an increased risk of involuntary
commitment even when they may not actually meet the standards for
commitment. Courts rely on physicians’ diagnosis of a mental illness to
determine whether or not a person meets the qualifications of involuntarily
commitment.148 This grants physicians broad subjective power that may be
influenced by bias.149 For example, Black people are three times more likely
than white people to be diagnosed with schizophrenia.150 Further, nonwhite
males are significantly more likely than white males to be involuntarily
committed.151 This difference is not found for other forms of hospitalization,
such as voluntary commitment, indicating that the difference is likely due to
the coercive nature of involuntary commitment rather than an increased

141. Testa & West, supra note 137, at 37.
142. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, FEDERAL FIREARMS
PROHIBITION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2009), https://www.atf.gov/file/58791/download
[https://perma.cc/35YQ-E796].
143. Testa & West, supra note 137, at 37.
144. Id.
145. Leo Beletsky & Denise Tomasini-Joshi, ‘Treatment Facilities’ Aren’t What You Think They Are,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/opinion/opioid-jails-treatmentfacilities.html [https://perma.cc/789U-3RNE (dark archive)].
146. Id.
147. Leo Beletsky & Elizabeth Ryan, The Wrong Path: Involuntary Treatment and the Opioid Crisis,
CRIME REP. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/08/16/the-wrong-path-involuntarytreatment-and-the-opioid-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/7XF8-ZW3E].
148. Henry T. Lynch, Involuntary Hospitalization and Bias Against Marginalized Groups, 18 STAN.
UNDERGRADUATE RSCH. J. 40, 41 (2019).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Sarah Rosenfield, Race Differences in Involuntary Hospitalization: Psychiatric vs. Labeling
Perspectives, 25 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 14, 17 (1984).
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presence of mental illness in nonwhites.152 One study found that when
comparing nonwhites to whites with similar psychiatric conditions and levels
of dangerous behavior, nonwhites were still more likely to be involuntarily
committed than whites.153 Thus, because minorities may be involuntarily
committed due to bias and stigma rather than because they meet the standards
for commitment, § 922(g)(4) overincludes minority populations.
Even though these groups of people typically cannot be involuntarily
committed unless they are found to be both mentally ill and dangerous,154 the
underlying reason for their commitment does not justify a lifetime gun ban
for these classifications of people. Thus, § 922(g)(4) is too broad in scope and
not adequately targeted towards a group of people who actually pose a danger
of committing dangerous, unpremeditated criminal acts.
3. “[O]nce Mentally Ill Does Not Mean Always Mentally Ill”
Finally, as Justice McKeague noted in his concurrence in Tyler, “once
mentally ill does not mean always mentally ill.”155 The MacArthur Foundation
study from 1998, which is still widely cited today, compared “civil admission”
patients to a control group in the same neighborhood.156 The study found that
committed patients were less likely to have actual or threatened weapon
violence compared to their neighbors.157 Notably, the study found that there
was a decline in violence of the studied former patients over time.158 Despite
the fact that only “3%–5% of violent crimes in the United States are attributed
to serious mental illness,” people view those with mental illnesses as a
threat.159 However, “those with mental illness may actually be less likely to
commit serious violent acts than the general population.”160 These studies and
statistics indicate that the scope of § 922(g)(4) is not proportional to the
interest served because those involuntarily committed, let alone those with a
history of mental illness, are not the greatest source of danger in our society.
152. See id. at 17–18 (“[T]he relationship between race and involuntary hospitalization remains
for males when the type and severity of disorder is controlled. Thus, the analysis supports a labeling
perspective on race differences.”).
153. Id.
154. SAMHSA, supra note 9, at 11–12.
155. Tyler v. Hillsdale County, 837 F.3d 678, 700 (6th Cir. 2016) (McKeague, J., concurring).
156. Steadman et al., supra note 87, at 394.
157. Id. at 400 (finding former patients had a 22.3% risk of weapon violence while other
members of that same community had a 42.3% risk). The study noted that substance abuse is what
significantly raises the prevalence of violence in both the civilly committed and community samples.
Id.
158. Id.
159. Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, Worse than Punishment: How the Involuntary
Commitment of Persons with Mental Illness Violates the United States Constitution, 47 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 499, 517 (2020).
160. Id. at 518.
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The Ninth Circuit found the government’s citations to the metaanalysis—which showed the risk of suicide for involuntary committed persons
to be thirty-nine times higher than what was expected—heavily persuasive.161
Yet that same analysis also found that this heightened risk of suicide for those
involuntarily committed is greatest “following short first admissions.”162 The
sampling in that study did not include any persons whose involuntary
commitments were as long ago as both Mai and Tyler.163 Of the 14,000
patients studied, 98% were studied for the year following their commitment
and only 2% were studied for 2.5–8.5 years post-commitment.164 The court in
Mai also conveniently failed to mention that the study’s conclusion was that
“[s]uicide risk seems highest at the beginning of treatment and diminishes
thereafter.”165
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the “right to keep and bear
arms” is a “fundamental right necessary to our system of ordered liberty,”166
and when one such fundamental right is at stake, strict scrutiny is favored.167
Excluding an entire class of people from pursuing a fundamental right for life
should require evidence that their mental illness lasts for life. Further,
affirmative evidence that those with a history of involuntary commitment are
more dangerous than the general public is needed if a lower level of scrutiny is
going to be applied.168 To do less indicates that a class of people who may have
fully recovered from mental illness are entitled to lesser rights than the
average population. Rather than provide evidence that people previously
involuntarily committed have a sufficient continued risk of danger to
themselves and others, the government has exacerbated the negative
stereotypes of the mentally ill by defending § 922(g)(4).
IV. SOLUTIONS
Although the government’s interests in keeping guns out of the hands of
those who pose a danger to themselves and others are important, § 922(g)(4)
infringes on the constitutional right to bear arms. A better solution is needed
to address these interests. This part examines possible solutions, which include
creating a federal extreme risk law that adequately instills measures to protect
161. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
162. Harris & Barraclough, supra note 101, at 220.
163. See supra notes 33 and 49 and accompanying text.
164. Harris & Barraclough, supra note 101, at 219–20.
165. Id. at 223.
166. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).
167. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (holding strict scrutiny applies to
“fundamental” liberty interests).
168. “[W]ithout such a comparison [of previously committed individuals’ propensity for violence
compared to the general population], the data is insufficient to justify § 922(g)(4)’s perpetual
curtailment of a constitutional right.” Tyler v. Hillsdale County, 837 F.3d 678, 696 (6th Cir. 2016).
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safety while also protecting the rights of those subjected to involuntary
commitment.
A.

Bring Back § 925(c) Relief-from-Disabilities Program or Expand NICS
Improvement Amendments Act

One solution to this important issue is to leave § 922(g)(4) as is and
bring back § 925(c) Relief-from-Disabilities Program. Congress defunded the
program in 1992 because reviewing the applications was a “very difficult and
subjective task which could have devastating consequences for innocent
citizens if the wrong decision is made.”169 Ironically, with the relief program
gone, every single citizen who has been involuntarily committed now faces the
devasting consequence of a fundamental right being taken away for life.170
Nevertheless, Congress makes a reasonable argument that a federal relief
program would likely be inefficient and too subjective.171 While there may not
be a reasonable expectation to view individuals on a case-by-case basis, how
the law stands fails to recognize that “[o]nce depressed does not mean always
depressed; once mentally ill does not mean always mentally ill; and once
institutionalized does not mean always institutionalized.”172
Further, requiring that the government fund such a program may run
counter to established precedent that “[s]ome categorical disqualifications are
permissible: Congress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who
have been shown to be untrustworthy with weapons.”173 Regardless, simply
the availability of being able to apply for relief from the § 922(g)(4) lifetime
ban does not make the law itself constitutional.174 As the Sixth Circuit noted,
Congress’s establishment of the relief-from-disabilities program from 1986 to
1992 is a sign that Congress realized that it is not “reasonably necessary to
forever bar all previously institutionalized persons from owning a firearm.”175
Therefore, refunding the program does little to solve the biggest issue:
§ 922(g)(4) does not even surpass intermediate scrutiny.
Another option is complete state adoption of relief-from-disabilities
programs. Under the NICS Improvement Amendments Act, states must
169. Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-353, at
19–20 (1992)).
170. See Is There a Way for a Prohibited Person To Restore Their Right To Receive or Possess Firearms
and Ammunition?, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/there-way-prohibited-person-restore-their-right-receive-or-possessfirearms-and [https://perma.cc/R5FP-W63L].
171. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1111 (citing S. REP. NO. 102-353, at 19).
172. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 710 (Sutton, J., concurring).
173. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).
174. See supra Section III.C.
175. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 698 (“It is a clear indication that Congress does not believe that
previously committed persons are sufficiently dangerous as a class to permanently deprive all such
persons of their Second Amendment right to bear arms.”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 919 (2022)

940

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

create a relief-from-disabilities program in order to receive federal funds.176
Because creating such a program is a choice by the states, there is unequal
availability of this remedy, as only thirty-two states currently have a relief
program.177 Under anti-commandeering principals, the federal government
cannot force all states to offer such a program,178 making it impossible to
ensure availability of remedies. Further, just like § 925(c), the availability of a
state relief-from-disabilities program does not make § 922(g)(4) constitutional
on its face.179
B.

The Fix: A Federal Extreme Risk Law

The best solution to actually keeping guns out of the hands of those who
pose a danger of committing unpremeditated crimes with firearms as a result
of mental disturbances is to replace § 922(g)(4) with a federal extreme risk
law. Extreme risk protection order (“ERPO”) laws, or colloquially known as
“red flag” laws, temporarily remove guns from the hands of persons who are
determined by a judge to be currently at an imminent risk of harming
themselves or others.180 The basic process under an ERPO law is as follows.
First, a law enforcement officer, family member, or other professional (such as
a person’s physician) can petition a court to place a person under an ERPO.181
Next, the court can immediately enter a short-term, ex parte ERPO so long as
the petitioner meets their burden of proof.182 Not until after a full, adversary
hearing may the court enter a longer, yet temporary, ERPO.183 This order
requires the person to relinquish their firearms and prevents them from
obtaining new ones while the ERPO is in effect.184 About nineteen states have
adopted these laws,185 but there have been few attempts at any federal
legislation.186

176. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
177. See GOGGINS & GALLEGOS, supra note 30, at 8.
178. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 173 (1992); see also BRIAN T. YEH, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R44797, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON
GRANT FUNDS 3 (2017).
179. See supra Section III.C.
180. Joseph Blocher & Jacob D. Charles, Firearms, Extreme Risk, and Legal Design: “Red Flag”
Laws and Due Process, 106 VA. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2020).
181. Id. at 1288–89.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Extreme Risk Protection Orders, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gunlaws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/extreme-risk-protection-orders/ [https://perma.cc/6CTL-SXF
S]. For further analysis of the history of state ERPO laws, see Coleman Gay, “Red Flag” Laws: How
Law Enforcement’s Controversial New Tool To Reduce Mass Shooting Fits Within Current Second
Amendment Jurisprudence, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1491, 1499–510 (2020).
186. Blocher & Charles, supra note 180, at 1298.
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1. ERPO Laws Better Address the Government’s Interests
The effect of the ERPO is that it targets only those currently posing a
danger to themselves or others,187 which would effectively address the
government’s important and compelling interests of preventing crime and
suicide.188 Although research on these laws is limited due to their recency,
studies have already shown that ERPO laws are working to prevent
suicides.189 One study, analyzing the effectiveness of Connecticut’s ERPO law
between 1999 and 2013, found that “one suicide was averted for every ten or
eleven guns seized.”190 Persons subjected to state ERPO laws were found to
have suicide rates thirty times higher than the average person,191 showing these
laws are properly targeting those most at risk of self-harm. In its 2021 report,
Brady United Against Gun Violence called for the passing of ERPO laws to
aid in the prevention of the gun suicide epidemic because of the demonstrated
effectiveness of state ERPO laws.192 Because more than two-thirds of suicides
in America are committed with firearms,193 it is clear that keeping firearms out
of the hands of those who pose the greatest risk of self-harm is necessary. But
because fifty percent of people who die from suicide by gun are those who do
not even have a diagnosed mental illness,194 an ERPO law that focuses on
individual behavioral risk factors would be more effective than a law like
§ 922(g)(4).195
Further, by limiting who can initiate an ERPO, these laws work to better
target persons at risk of committing a crime or suicide. The aforementioned
MacArthur study found that those with the highest risk of experiencing
violence caused by persons with a history of commitment were their family
and friends inside the home.196 Because of this, family and friends who may
initiate an ERPO proceeding are better suited to assessing the need to remove
a gun from someone with behavioral risks of firearm misuse.197 Ultimately,
ERPO laws are more effective at targeting individuals who are currently
danger risks because family and friends are much better at identifying at-risk

187. William Frizzell & Joseph Chien, Extreme Risk Protection Orders To Reduce Firearm Violence,
70 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 75, 76 (2019).
188. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
189. Blocher & Charles, supra note 180, at 1300.
190. Id.
191. Timothy Williams, What Are ‘Red Flag’ Gun Laws, and How Do They Work?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/red-flag-laws.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/D9Q3-J5S9 (dark archive)].
192. BRADY REPORT, supra note 127, at 14–15.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id. at 14.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Steadman et al., supra note 87, at 400.
197. BRADY REPORT, supra note 127, at 14.
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individuals than merely someone’s record of previous involuntary
commitment.
2. ERPO Laws Do Not Stigmatize the Mentally Ill
While § 922(g)(4) equates history of involuntary commitment with
mental illness and effectively assumes that once deemed mentally ill, one is
permanently dangerous,198 many state ERPO laws do not require a finding of
mental illness in order for an ERPO to be entered. In Connecticut, for
example, an ERPO may be entered if an individual is found to “pose[] a risk
of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals.”199
The law says nothing about mental health or illness.200 In fact, Connecticut
lawmakers specifically rejected the idea of basing the law on a diagnosis of
mental illness by a psychiatrist in fear that this would stigmatize persons with
mental illnesses.201 Similarly, Indiana’s ERPO law requires a finding that an
individual is “dangerous” under the meaning of the statute.202 “Dangerous” is
defined to specifically state that “[t]he fact that an individual has been
released from a mental health facility or has a mental illness that is currently
controlled by medication does not establish that the individual is dangerous”
under the meaning of the statute.203 Thus, rather than stigmatize the mentally
ill, a federal ERPO law could be limited to assessing one’s current level of
danger rather than one’s status in relation to their mental health history.
3. Criticism of ERPO Laws
Critics of ERPO laws find them problematic for being a “pre-crime”
punishment and note that there is a fundamental difference between
“restraining a person who has harmed others” and “restraining someone who is
only at risk of doing so.”204 Yet this criticism falls flat when compared to what
is happening under the current law. Under § 922(g)(4), persons can also be
involuntarily committed having never committed a crime.205 Rather, the test
for whether a person should be committed is if they are at risk of harming

198. See supra Section III.C.3.
199. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c (Westlaw through all enactments of the 2021 Reg. Sess.
and the 2021 June Spec. Sess.).
200. See id.
201. Jeffrey W. Swanson, Michael A. Norko, Hsiu-Ju Lin, Kelly Alanis-Hirsch, Linda K.
Frisman, Madelon V. Baranoski, Michele M. Easter, Allison G. Robertson, Marvin S. Swartz &
Richard J. Bonnie, Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Removal Law: Does It
Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 186 (2017).
202. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2 (Westlaw through all legislation of the 2021 1st Reg. Sess. of
the 122d Gen. Assemb.).
203. Id. § 35-47-14-1(b).
204. Blocher & Charles, supra note 180, at 1286–87.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
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themselves or others, not whether or not they have done so.206 Some critics
also allege that these laws violate due process, seeing as they result in the
taking of property before a full hearing.207 While constitutional due process
typically requires the opportunity to be heard before the taking of one’s
property,208 this does not “always require[] the State to provide a hearing prior
to the initial deprivation of property.”209 The Supreme Court has held that
procedural due process is still satisfied if there is either (1) a need for quick
action by the state or (2) it is impractical to provide “meaningful
predeprivation process.”210 Involuntary commitment, which happens without
procedural due process, has been found to fall into the first category.211
Because involuntary commitment permanently affects firearm rights, ERPO
laws would also be justified under the need for quick action by the state.
Despite these criticisms, a federal ERPO law addressing those who pose
a risk of firearm misuse is the best option for replacing a statute that not only
presents an unconstitutional lifetime ban but is both overinclusive and
underinclusive and has failed by substituting “rough status proxies for risk.”212
Unlike § 922(g)(4), a ban on gun possession under a federal EPRO law would
be temporary. The initial removal of a gun would be similar to that of a
temporary domestic violence protective order, extending ten days before a
formal hearing can be held.213 Similar to Massachusetts’ ERPO law, the gun
suspension will not be continued until after the individual has had a formal
hearing in which dangerousness is proven, and even then, the ban on gun
possession will only last up to a year.214
4. Constitutionality of ERPO Laws
If a federal ERPO law were to be enacted, it must pass constitutional
muster. As earlier discussed, when assessing Second Amendment challenges,
courts use a two-step inquiry asking: “(1) whether the challenged law burdens
conduct protected by the Second Amendment and (2) if so, directs courts to
apply an appropriate level of scrutiny.”215 Under step one of the Second
Amendment analysis, just like § 922(g)(4), an ERPO law is not limited to

206. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
207. Blocher & Charles, supra note 180, at 1291.
208. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
209. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981).
210. Id. at 539.
211. See Blocher & Charles, supra note 180, at 1326–27.
212. Id. at 1294.
213. Shawn E. Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 450 (2020).
214. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131S (Westlaw through Ch. 14 of the 2022 2d Ann.
Sess.); see also Bethany Stevens, Massachusetts Adopts “Red Flag” Law, 62 BOS. BAR J. 6, 7 (2018).
215. Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.
Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013)).
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persons in a “presumptively lawful” category as provided by Heller because it
does not, and should not, hinge on a finding of mental illness.216
Thus, a federal ERPO law constitutionality assessment would proceed to
step two. The debate over whether strict or intermediate scrutiny applies thus
continues, but assuming the higher standard of strict scrutiny applies, the
federal ERPO law must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.”217 As discussed, the government has a compelling
interest of preventing crime and suicide.218 State ERPO laws have been found
to be appropriately tailored to such interests.219 In Redington v. State,220 the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Indiana’s ERPO law as applied to
him.221 The Indiana Court of Appeals found it relevant that under Indiana’s
ERPO law, the plaintiff is able to petition the court every 180 days for return
of his firearms.222 Further, the court noted that the state “bears the burden of
proving that the individual is ‘dangerous’ by a heightened clear and
convincing evidence standard.”223 ERPO laws like Indiana’s do not present the
same constitutional issues as § 922(g)(4) because they do not effectively create
lifetime bans, and they require an actual finding of dangerousness rather than
relying on one’s mental health history. Because the proposed federal ERPO
law will target an individual rather than a class, a hearing will ultimately be
required to show a standard of danger exists now, and the data show the risk of
danger of persons with mental illnesses is highest at first and then decreases,224
a temporary ban on gun possession through the form of an ERPO law would
be held constitutional.
CONCLUSION
Heller refers to the mentally ill in the present sense.225 Yet “[o]ne’s status
as . . . ‘mentally ill’ may change over the course of a lifetime”226—something
§ 922(g)(4) fails to acknowledge. “[T]he mental health of Clifford Tyler in
1986 is [not] the mental health of Clifford Tyler in 2016,”227 and the mental
health of Duy Mai in 1999 is not the mental health of Duy Mai in 2020. Until
§ 922(g)(4) is replaced with a better approach to keep guns out of the hands of
216.
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227.
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See id. at 835.
See supra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 708 (Sutton, J., concurring).
Id. at 710.
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those who pose a true danger of possessing firearms, courts will continue to
strip a fundamental right from a class of people who are being stigmatized for
a record of involuntary commitment that cannot be erased, and the
government’s compelling interests of preventing crime and suicide will go
unmet.
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